Abstract-We investigate secret key generation for a "pairwise independent network" model in which every pair of terminals observes correlated sources which are independent of sources observed by all other pairs of terminals. The terminals are then allowed to communicate interactively in multiple rounds over a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity, with all such communication being observed by all the terminals. The objective is to generate a secret key shared by a given subset of terminals at the largest rate possible. All the terminals cooperate in generating the secret key, with secrecy being required from an eavesdropper which has access to the public interterminal communication. We provide a (singleletter) formula for the secrecy capacity for this model, and show a natural connection between the problem of secret key generation and the combinatorial problem of maximal packing of Steiner trees in an associated multigraph. In particular, we show that the maximum number of Steiner tree packings in the multigraph is always a lower bound for the secrecy capacity. The bound is tight for the case when all the terminals seek to share a secret key; the mentioned connection yields an explicit capacity-achieving algorithm. This algorithm, which can be executed in polynomial time, extracts a group-wide secret key of the optimum rate from the collection of optimum and mutually independent secret keys for pairs of terminals.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well-known that separate terminals, with access to the outputs of distinct but correlated sources and afforded the means to communicate over a noiseless public channel, can devise a secret key. Thus, these terminals can generate secret common randomness which is effectively concealed from an eavesdropper which observes the public interterminal communication, and perhaps also side information in the form of the output of a "wiretapped" source which is correlated with the other sources.
The problem of secret key generation by two terminals (with and without an additional wiretapped terminal) was first studied by Maurer [6] , [7] and Ahlswede and Csiszár [1] , and subsequently investigated by several authors. A singleletter characterization of secrecy capacity -the largest rate at which secrecy can be generated -is known when the wiretapper is absent [6] , [7] , [1] ; partial results are available for the situation when a wiretapper is present.
Csiszár and Narayan [2] studied secrecy generation for a multiterminal "source model" with m terminals, in which the terminals observe correlated sources, following which all the terminals can communicate interactively in multiple rounds over a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity, with all such communication observed by all the terminals. The objective is to generate a secret key shared by a given subset of the m terminals at the largest rate possible. All the terminals cooperate in generating the secret key, with secrecy being required from the eavesdropper which has access to only the public interterminal communication. A single-letter characterization of secrecy capacity for this model was given in [2] , in which several variant models were also studied.
In this paper, we consider a "pairwise independent network" model introduced in [12] (see also [11] ). This model, hereafter abbreviated as the PIN model, is a special case of the multiterminal source model in [2] , and is motivated by practical aspects of a wireless communication network in which terminals communicate on the same frequency [11] . In a typical multipath environment, the wireless channel between each pair of terminals produces a random mapping between the transmitted and received signals which is timevarying and location-specific. For a fixed time and location, this mapping is reciprocal, i.e., effectively the same in both directions. Also, the mapping decorrelates over different time-coherence intervals as well as over distances of the order of a few wavelengths. Thus, in the PIN model, every pair of terminals can be assumed to observe correlated sources which are independent of sources observed by all other pairs of terminals. Furthermore, the PIN model reveals points of contact between secret key generation and a combinatorial problem of graph packing.
Our main contributions are as follows. We derive, using the results of [2] , a (single-letter) formula for the secrecy capacity for a PIN model when a given subset of the m terminals seek to share a secret key with the cooperation of all the terminals. It is seen that this formula can be expressed in terms of a linear combination of mutual information terms that involve only pairs of "reciprocal" random variables (rvs). Further, we investigate a natural connection between the problem of secrecy generation and the combinatorial problem of maximal packing of Steiner trees in an associated multigraph. In particular, we show that the maximum number of Steiner tree packings in the multigraph is always a lower bound for the secrecy capacity. The bound is tight for the case when all the terminals share the secret key. In the latter situation, the mentioned connection yields an explicit capacity-achieving algorithm. This algorithm, which can be executed in polynomial time, extracts a group-wide secret key of the optimum rate from the collection of optimum and mutually independent secret keys for pairs of terminals.
Basic concepts and definitions are presented in the next section. Section III contains the statements of our results accompanied by sketches of proofs.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Suppose that the terminals in M = {1, . . . , m}, m ≥ 2, observe n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of the rvsX 1 , . . . ,X m , denoted byX
We shall be concerned throughout with a PIN model, introduced in [12] , where each rvX i , i ∈ M, is of the formX i = (X ij , j ∈ M\{i}) with m − 1 components, and the "reciprocal pairs" of rvs {(X ij , X ji ) , 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m} are mutually independent. Thus, every pair of terminals i, j in M is associated with a corresponding pair of rvs (X ij , X ji ) , which are independent of all other pairs of rvs (X i j , X j i ) associated with the terminals i , j with i = i or j = j (or both). All the rvs are assumed to take their values in finite sets. Following their observation of the random sequences as above, the terminals in M are allowed to communicate among themselves over a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity; all such communication, which may be interactive and conducted in multiple rounds, is observed by all the terminals. A communication from a terminal, in general, can be any function of its observed sequence as well as all previous public communication. The public communication of all the terminals will be denoted collectively by F = F (n) . The overall goal is to generate shared secret common randomness for a given set A ⊆ M of terminals at the largest rate possible, with the remaining terminals (if any) cooperating in secrecy generation. The resulting secret key must be accessible to every terminal in A; but it need not be accessible to the terminals not in A and nor does it need to be concealed from them. It must, of course, be kept secret from the eavesdropper which has access to the public interterminal communication F, but is otherwise passive, i.e., unable to tamper with this communication.
The following basic concepts and definitions are from [2] , [3] . Given > 0, for rvs U, V , we say that U is -recoverable from V if P r{U = f (V )} ≤ for some function f (V ) of V . With the rvs K and F representing a secret key and the eavesdropper's knowledge, respectively, information theoretic secrecy entails that the security index 1 s(K; F) = log |K| − H(K|F) be required to be small, where K is the range of K and | | denotes cardinality. This requirement simultaneously renders K to be nearly uniformly distributed and nearly independent of F.
Definition 1: Given any set A ⊆ M of size |A| ≥ 2, a rv K constitutes an -secret key ( -SK) for the set of terminals A, achievable with communication F, if K is -recoverable from X n i , F for each i ∈ A and, in addition, it satisfies the secrecy condition
The condition (1) corresponds to the concept of "strong" secrecy in which = n = o(1) [8] , [3] , as distinct from the earlier "weak" secrecy concept which requires only that n = o(n) [7] , [1] .
Definition 2: A number R is an achievable SK rate for a set of terminals A ⊆ M if there exist n -SKs K (n) for A, achievable with communication F, such that n → 0 and
The largest achievable SK rate for A is the SK capacity C(A). Thus, by definition, the SK capacity for A is the largest rate of a rv that is recoverable at each terminal in A from the information available to it, and is nearly uniformly distributed and effectively concealed from an eavesdropper with access to the public interterminal communication; it need not be concealed from the terminals in A c = M\A which cooperate in secrecy generation.
A single-letter characterization of the SK capacity C(A), A ⊆ M, for a general mutiterminal "source model," -of which the PIN model is a special case -is provided in [2] . An upper bound for C(A) in terms of Kullback-Leibler divergence is also given in [2] which is tight for m = 2 and m = 3, A = M.
III. RESULTS
Our main results are the following. First, we obtain, upon particularizing the results of [2] , a (single-letter) formula for C(A) for a PIN model, expressed in terms of a linear combination of mutual information terms that involve only pairs of "reciprocal" rvs (X ij , X ji ) , i = j. Second, a connection is then drawn between SK generation for the PIN model and the combinatorial problem of maximal packing of Steiner 1 All logarithms are to the base 2.
trees in an associated multigraph. In particular, the maximum number of Steiner tree packings in the multigraph is always a lower bound for SK capacity. Third, this connection yields an explicit SK capacity-achieving algorithm for the case A = M (when the Steiner tree becomes a spanning tree); the algorithm forms the SK out of independent SKs for pairs of terminals. As a consequence, it also establishes the tightness in this case of the upper bound for C(M) in [2] .
We first present the SK capacity C(A) for the PIN model. 
Proposition 3.1: For a PIN model, the SK capacity for a set of terminals A ⊆ M, with |A| ≥ 2, is
Remark: It is of interest to note from (4) that the SK capacity for a PIN model depends on the joint probability distribution of the underlying rvs only through the values of the pairwise reciprocal mutual information terms.
Proof:
The proof entails an application of the formula for SK capacity in [2] , [3] to the PIN model. For B ∈ B(A), denoteX B = X i , i ∈ B . From ( [3] , Theorem 3.1),
For the PIN model, sinceX i = (X ij , j ∈ M\{i}) , a straightforward manipulation of (5) gives
Upon using (3), the assertion follows.
In ( [2] , Example 4), an upper bound for SK capacity was given for a general multiterminal "source model." This bound was expressed in terms of the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the joint distribution of the rvs defining the underlying correlated sources and the product of the (marginal) distributions associated with appropriate partitions of these rvs, thereby measuring the minimum mutual dependence among the latter. The bound was particularized to the PIN model in [12] , and is restated below (in a slightly different form). The significance of this upper bound for C(A) in the present work arises from its role -by virtue of its special form -in suggesting an explicit algorithm for achieving SK capacity for the case A = M. This algorithm leads to a lower bound for C(A) which, in fact, will turn out to coincide with the upper bound.
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Let P k = (P 1 , . . . , P k ) be a partition (of size k) of M = {1, . . . , m} such that each P u , u = 1, . . . , k, intersects A, where 2 ≤ k ≤ |A|.
Lemma 3.2 [12]:
The SK capacity C(A), A ⊆ M, for the PIN model is bounded above according to
There exists a natural connection between SK generation for the PIN model and the combinatorial problem of tree packing in an associated multigraph.
Let G = (V, E) be a multigraph, i.e., a connected undirected graph with no selfloops and with possibly multiple edges between any vertex pair, whose vertex set V = M = {1, . . . , m} and edge set is E.
Definition 3:
For A ⊆ M, a Steiner tree of G is a subgraph of G which is a tree and whose vertex set contains A. A Steiner packing of G is any collection of disjoint Steiner trees of G. Let μ(A, G) denote the maximum size of such a packing (cf. [5] ).
Next, assume without any loss of generality that in the PIN model, all pairwise reciprocal mutual information values I(X ij ∧ X ji ), 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m, are rational numbers.
3
Let N denote the collection of positive integers n such that nI(X ij ∧ X ji ) is integer-valued for all 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m; clearly, the elements of N will form an arithmetic progression. For a PIN model, consider a sequence of associated multigraphs {G (n) = M, E (n) , n ∈ N}, where E (n) , n ∈ N, is such that the number of edges between any pair of vertices i, j is equal to nI(X ij ∧ X ji ). The connection between SK generation for the PIN model and Steiner tree packing is formalized below.
Theorem 3.3:
For a PIN model, the SK capacity satisfies
for every A ⊆ M.
Sketch of proof:
The proof consists of two main steps. First, every pair of vertices (i, j) in G generates a pairwise SK of size nI(X ij ∧ X ji ) bits for some n ∈ N. By the definition of the PIN model, all such pairwise SKs are mutually independent. Next, every Steiner tree serves to generate one bit of SK for the terminals in A. Specifically, for edges (i, j) and (i, j ), j = j , with common vertex i in the Steiner tree, vertex i communicates to vertices j, j the binary sum of two independent SK bits -one with j and the other with j -obtained from the first step. This enables i, j, j to share any one of these two bits as a (common) SK. This method of SK propagation ( [2] , proof of Theorem 5) enables all the vertices in A, which are connected in the Steiner tree, to share one bit of SK. Therefore, the maximum number of shared SK bits that can be generated by this mechanism equals the maximum number of Steiner trees that can be packed in G (n) , for every n ∈ N . Consequently, the maximum rate of a SK thus generated is equal to the rightside of (7), and constitutes a lower bound for C(A).
Remark: Note that the SK bits generated by the Steiner tree packing operation in the second step above are (perfectly) independent of the public communication in that step. Hence, if the pairwise SKs in the preceding step are generated so as to satisfy the "strong" secrecy condition (1), so too will the final SK shared by the terminals in A with regard to the entire public communication.
When A = M, a Steiner tree is a spanning tree of G (n) , n ∈ N . We show below that the maximum number of disjoint spanning trees that can be packed in G (n) , normalized by n, approaches the upper bound C ub (A) 3 Else, approximate a mutual information value by a rational number.
for C(A) in Lemma 3.2. This implies that for the case A = M, the lower bound for C(M) in Theorem 3.3 is, in fact, tight. The proof of this fact, stated below, provides a polynomial-time algorithm which generates a capacityachieving SK for the terminals in M out of optimum and mutually independent SKs for pairs of terminals in M.
Theorem 3.4:
(i) For a PIN model, the SK capacity C(M) is
(ii) Furthermore, a polynomial-time algorithm exists for SK generation at the optimum rate in (8) .
Remark: It is clear that given a combinatorial problem of finding the maximal packing of Steiner (or spanning) trees in a multigraph, we can also associate with it a problem of SK generation for an associated PIN model. The SK capacity of the PIN models yields an upper bound for the maximum number of disjoint Steiner trees that can be packed in the multigraph; the upper bound is tight in the case of spanning tree packing.
Sketch of proof: (i) It is clear that
is nondecreasing in n, by the definition of G (n) . Our proof uses a result of Nash-Williams [9] and Tutte that, given a multigraph G = (M, E), the maximum number of disjoint spanning trees that can be packed in G is equal to min P 1 |P| − 1 (number of edges that cross P) , with the minimization being over all partitions P of M, and where for a fixed P an edge of G is said to cross P if its end vertices are in different cells of P [9] , [10] . Applying this to G (n) as above, we have that for n ∈ N, The assertion in (8) is now immediate.
(ii) The polynomial-time algorithm for generating a SK of the optimal rate is derived from a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a maximal collection of disjoint spanning trees that can be packed in G (n) [4] .
Remark: In the general proof of achievability of SK capacity in [2] , a SK of optimum rate was extracted from "omniscience," i.e., from a reconstruction by the terminals in A of all the observed signalsX n 1 , . . . ,X n m . In contrast, the scheme above for achieving the SK capacity for a PIN model with A = M neither seeks nor attains omniscience.
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